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BOOK REVIEWS
What is To Be Done? Proposals for the Soviet Transition to the Market,
Merton J. Peck and Thomas J. Richardson, editors, New Haven and
London: Yale University Press, 1991.
Vladimir Kontorovich *
This book is the result of a study commissioned by a Soviet govern-
ment agency which sought the advice of Western economists on trans-
forming the Soviet economy along market lines. The project involved
several conferences sponsored by the International Institute for Applied
Systems Analysis in 1990, attended by Western, East European, and So-
viet economists. Not all of the project's recommendations were followed
in the Russian transition to market that started in January 1992. Yet the
project must have influenced its Soviet participants, who later became the
top members of the Russian cabinet and the architects of the current
transition strategy.
The introductory chapter, written by the editors, recounts the his-
tory of the project, analyzes the state of the Soviet economy in 1990, and
highlights the main proposals for transition. Chapter 2 is a condensed
version of the reform proposals. It was presented as a memorandum to
Soviet President Gorbachev at the end of 1990. The following five chap-
ters are written by the chairmen of the study groups at the 1990 confer-
ence and deal with particular aspects of transition. Chapter 3, by Merton
Peck and Alfred Kahn, discusses the establishment of a market: setting
off the price mechanism, making producers behave as profit maximizers,
and promoting competition. Subsequent chapters deal with
macroeconomic stabilization (William Nordhaus), external economic re-
lations (Richard Cooper), moderating the social costs of unemployment
(Wil Albeda), and privatizing and creating a commercial banking system
(Kimio Uno). An appendix to the book, by Petr Aven, chronicles Soviet
economic developments since the mid-1980s.
The book stresses the interconnected nature of the elements of a
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market economy, such as prices set by supply and demand, private own-
ership, well-organized capital markets, internal and foreign competition,
and sound money.' All these components must be present for a market
economy to work efficiently. From this indisputable proposition follows
the book's central recommendation. The main elements of the market
economy have to be introduced simultaneously. Prices should be liberal-
ized, enterprises converted into managerially and financially autonomous
entities, government spending stabilized and credit restricted, social costs
of unemployed moderated, and the economy opened to both internal and
international competition - all at the same time.2
If this list exhausts the elements necessary for smooth functioning of
a market economy, and all of these elements can indeed be put into place
simultaneously, then the problem of transition to market is resolved.
The enactment of a carefully drafted legislation creates a market econ-
omy, a world in which profit-maximizing producers, respond to price
signals in the ways familiar to Western economists. What is left to be
done is the usual set of tasks of fiscal and monetary management, anti-
trust and safety-net policies. In fact, there is no transition here, but
rather a leap from command to market realm.
As it happens, the book's list of measures is incomplete. For exam-
ple, a competent and honest government that would enforce the laws and
regulate the economy is commonly considered a prerequisite for a mod-
em market economy, which is especially relevant for the Soviet/Russian
context. Relegating the creation of a housing market to a few lines is also
an omission.3 More importantly, a complete list of conditions necessary
for a smoothly functioning market can hardly ever be produced, for the
same reason that complex hardware and software designs cannot be pro-
duced without bugs. The enactment of a comprehensive set of measures
would not result in a workable market economy, but in a hybrid system
with potentially surprising characteristics. Managing this hybrid and
turning it into a workable market economy is what the transition is all
about.
There is another problem with the book's prescription for a leap into
market. Each of the necessary features of a market economy take differ-
ent amounts of time to set up. For this reason, they cannot be imple-
mented simultaneously. Thus, prices can be freed from administrative
control practically by a stroke of a pen. Merton Peck and Alfred Kahn
I What Is To Be Done? Proposals for the Soviet Transition to the Market 41 - 42 (Merton .
Peck and Thomas J. Richardson eds., 1991)
2 Id., at 9.
3 Id, at 141.
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advocate just this course of action in their chapter. But for prices to
work properly, producers should be maximizing profit. Such behavior
would make sense if enterprises were privately owned. Yet "privatiza-
tion is going to take time", because there is no political agreement on
how to distribute ownership. So the authors propose a substitute that
would make producers respond to price signals as if they were profit
maximizers even before privatization and could be enacted simultane-
ously with price decontrol.' This substitute, called "corporatization,"
would include converting state enterprises into joint-stock companies,
enacting property and contract legislation, passing bankruptcy law, mak-
ing credit available at market interest rates only and ending direct and
disguised government subsidies. But this too, is going to take time.
With careful preparation, all the laws embodying the recommenda-
tions of the present volume can be passed simultaneously. But passing a
law on property or bankruptcy and making it effective are not the same
things. The former can be precisely timed; the latter takes time. We will
leave aside the fact that the disagreements among the Russians on each
of the elements of corporatization are as sharp as their disagreements on
the issue of privatization (witness the parliamentary deadlock over the
bankruptcy law earlier this year). Even if there is a consensus on the
shape of some future institution, and the corresponding law is passed
promptly, it will take time for this institution to start functioning. This
time is needed for the qualified individuals to step forward and join the
new institution; for them to learn their new roles - separately and in
coordination with each other - and for the institution as a whole to
learn to coexist with other actors in the economy.6
"What Is To Be Done?" is itself a good example of the fact that new
projects take time to mature. It was initiated in the fall of 1989, the text
was finished in the summer of 1991, and the book was published by the
end of that year. It took some of the best American and Russian econo-
mists, a well-funded intergovernmental organization, and an established
publishing house more than two years to complete this 220 page volume.
The task of corporatization - setting tens of thousands of enterprises
free of administrative control, and subjecting them to hard budget con-
straints is much more complex, and is likely to take much longer than
producing the present book.
4 Id., at 58-59.
5 Id., at 38, 58.
6 See Vladimir Kontorovich, Sovietskaia ekonomika v blizhaishei perspektive, 9 Ekonomika i
organizatsiia promyshlennogo proizvodstva 145, 146 (1991). Similar points were advanced in discus-
sion of the Soviet Shatalin plan (similar to the present book) in 1990.
479
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 13:477(1992)
The main prescription of the book - simultaneous enactment of all
the elements of a market economy - is unfeasible, because the list of
such elements is incomplete and some of those mentioned will take con-
siderable time to implement. The elements that interact so neatly in a
working market economy can only be introduced piecemeal into a mar-
ket economy in the making. There will necessarily be a period when the
transitional economy will have some market institutions but not others
(because the latter were left out of the original design, or have not taken
root yet). This means that market institutions that will be the first to
appear in the transitional economy will not perform well.
Thus, there is no reason to believe that the managers of corporatized
enterprises will be maximizing profits. The stock of the former state-
owned enterprises will be held by the government - appointed property
management agencies. These agencies will select enterprise directors
who in turn will hire the managers. The government will instruct the
agencies to maximize profits of subordinate enterprises, and the agencies
will demand the same from their corporations.7 However, "maximize
profit!" is not an enforceable command, as the reformers of centrally
planned economies have discovered over the last thirty years. The au-
thors propose to reinforce this command by compensating property man-
agement agencies and enterprises' directors with ownership shares.
While this is a real incentive, the temporary nature of the whole arrange-
ment is likely to make strategies other than profit maximization attrac-
tive. The property management boards will likely be catering to the
political needs of the government that appointed them. Enterprise man-
agers, possibly in collusion with the property management agencies, will
be positioning themselves to maximize their own gains in the coming
privatization, lobbying or blackmailing the government for subsidies, or
simply stripping their plants clean.
Independent producers who are not maximizing profits behave in
rather unusual ways. In 1988-91, when Soviet enterprises were given
some discretion over production decisions, they responded to higher
prices by cutting output. They also preferred high cost inputs to low
cost. This perverse behavior (negatively sloped supply curves and cost-
maximization) continued during the transition of 1992.8 Of course, fiscal
and monetary tightening was supposed to make such behavior unsustain-
able. Yet it was displayed on such a massive scale, that it instead made
the planned stabilization policies unsustainable.
7 What Is To Be Done, supra note 1, at 61.
8 See, e.g., Sergei Glaziev, Liberalizatsiiu tsen nelzia Nazvat'udachnoi, Nezavisimaia gazeta,
May 21, 1992, at 4 (analyzing Russian economic performance in early 1992).
480
Soviet Transition to the Market
13:477(1992)
The book differs from many other transition blueprints in its esti-
mate of the plan's immediate costs. It is usually thought that a transi-
tional economy, with a mix of old and new institutions as described
above, cannot work well. This has been confirmed as early as 1990 by
the experience of economic transformation in Poland. Decisive steps to-
ward market caused output to plunge. Living standards declined, and
unemployment increased. The present book states that its strategy, ap-
plied to the Soviet economy, will bring immediate gains by reversing the
ongoing output decline. One reason for this claim, as discussed above, is
that the book assumes away the difficulties of a transitional economy
with its recommendation of a "leap" into a market economy.
The other reason for the promise of a painless transition can be
found in the book's analysis of the causes of the economic contraction in
1990-91. "Output in the Soviet case is falling because consumer goods
and industrial inputs are no longer reliably available for rubles ..... The
measures proposed here aim quickly to restore the internal convertibility
of the ruble for domestic goods and services and thus to permit real out-
put to return to its 1989 level". 9 This cannot be a slip of the pen, since
elsewhere, the "return to an effectively functioning money economy" is
mentioned and the breakdown in interregional flow of goods is explained
by the decreasing reliance on the ruble as a medium of exchange."1 This
is a serious misconception about the nature of the Soviet economy.
Practically all producer and many consumer goods have not been
reliably or otherwise available for rubles for the last sixty years. They
were distributed by the government and Communist party officials in ac-
cordance with the national plan. This "allocation of resources by com-
mand" was the defining feature of the Soviet system. The Soviet
economy has been contracting since 1990 (if not 1989) because the mech-
anism for channeling supplies was first impaired, then decimated, by
Gorbachev's reforms. 1 Talk of restoring the internal convertibility of
the ruble and the effectively functioning money economy suggests a Latin
American or post-war European country that has been ravaged by hyper-
inflation. The role of money as a medium of exchange can be restored in
this case rather quickly by a set of monetary and fiscal measures because
all the capitalist institutions already exist. In Russia these institutions
have to be created anew.
When communist regimes started to topple in Eastern Europe, no
9 What Is To Be Done, supra note 1, at 16.
10 Id., at 43 and 55.
11 See The Disintegration of the Soviet Economic System 23, 24 (Michael Ellman and Vladimir
Kontorovich eds., 1992).
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literature on the economics of transition to capitalism existed. Yet the
discipline of economics responded to the new demand exactly the way it
would have predicted. Economists switched from other fields to the
study of transition and at least a dozen books and symposia in journals
devoted to this topic have appeared in just two or three years. Of course,
little new knowledge can be created in such a short time. What one can
hope for is the thorough application of the existing knowledge to a new
problem.
Charting the transition from command economy to a capitalist one
requires the knowledge of the point of departure, the destination point,
and the terrain between the two. The authors of this book are the experts
on the destination point, the workings of a capitalist economy. This is
also by far the strongest area of economics, since it has been studied for
hundreds of years. The book does an admirable job summarizing this
knowledge for the benefit of the Soviet reformers. The authors tried to
familiarize themselves with the point of departure, but have succeeded in
their endeavor only partially. The study of centrally planned economies
was a tiny and relatively young field. Much of the knowledge it has accu-
mulated has not been translated into the analytic language common to
other fields of economics. This knowledge exists in the shape of lengthy
institutional descriptions that take time to assimilate. Even drawing on
such authoritative sources like John Le Carre's The Russia House left the
authors of the book with a weak grasp of the nature of the system they
are proposing to overhaul. 12
The students of centrally planned economies have also learned some
potentially useful things about the third element in the theoretical transi-
tion map, the terrain between socialism and capitalism. Over the last
thirty years, there have been numerous half-hearted attempts to reform
these economies along market lines. The great distance between enacting
a law and changing the economy, the impossibility of effectively mandat-
ing objectives of economic actors and the inevitability of flaws in any
comprehensive organizational redesign are among the relevant lessons of
these failures. These are all negative lessons. Economists have little pos-
itive to say on the subject. Transition is about the emergence and devel-
opment of market institutions. And until very recently, economists have
been taking the institutions of market economy for granted.13
The lack of a good map does not mean travel is impossible. It just
takes longer and costs more, and there is a risk of getting in the wrong
12 What Is To Be Done, supra note 1, at 2.
13 As Ronald Coase has argued in his Nobel Prize speech. See Ronald Coase, The Institutional
Structure of Production, 82 Am. Econ. Rev. 713, 714 (Sept. 1992).
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place. Poland and Hungary may now have weathered the worst part of
the transition. But these were the two cases that were expected before-
hand to be the easiest. Economies of the former Soviet Union will have a
more difficult time with trial and error transition. They might even turn
back. Still, one hopes they will complete their journey sooner than it
takes the economists to come up with a decent map.
